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Abstract 
The smart cards are increasingly used in several fields with critical data that require security. We cite, as example, the 
medical field and payment shopping with smart card. Therefore, the hardware and software security of smart cards is one 
of the key elements of the security of sensitive information handled. Currently, several scientific researchers are interested 
in studying and enhancing the smart cards security. The study of vulnerabilities is a prerequisite for building security 
guarantees of this type of devices. Indeed, each vulnerability can easily lead to an attack. In this paper, we generate 
vulnerability test cases based on models of Europay-MasterCard and Visa (EMV) specifications. We used SysML 
language to model the EMV transaction through machine state diagram. Then, we generated Event-B model that we 
exploit it to generate vulnerability and robustness test cases. This work aims to ensure the safety of EMV cards against 
attacks exploiting the vulnerability of the system. 
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1. Introduction 
Embedded systems perform predefined tasks. They have binding specifications to fill in terms of energy 
consumption, cost, dependability and safety. Indeed, these systems may be holders of confidential information 
that should be maintained and protected for their users.  In particular, as regards the transmission of payment 
information through a smart card. In this context, smart cards have become targets for several reasons: First, 
they are available, easy to obtain [1] and inexpensive, which helps attackers to acquire large number of tests. 
Second, they are mobiles. So, it is easy for an attacker to submit them to a hostile environment. The third and 
the important reason is that a successful attack may allow access to confidential and sensitive data of users. 
For all these reasons, the designers and developers of smart cards are very aware. They pay very attention to 
the safety of their products, especially, when attackers of security systems are constantly developing new 
techniques to access information.  
Smart cards are devices made to ship potentially critical data and are therefore intended to be inviolable. 
As example, a case of an attack on a smart card is to determine the value of its cryptographic key by 
exploiting system vulnerabilities. To avoid such attack, we should ensure that the system is not vulnerable. 
The verification process is done through a series of tests performed on a real smart card. Our contribution is 
particularly interested to this axis. 
In this paper, we propose a new approach for testing payment application based on EMV specifications 
using model based testing integrated into a SysML development process. The paper is organized as follows: 
the second section presents an overview of Europay-Smartcard-Visa specifications. The third section lists the 
various tools used to establish our methodology. In the fourth section, we discuss our approach and steps of 
our methodology. 
2. Overview of EMV  
In this section, we provide a high-level of overview of EMV specifications contained in the volume 
entitled: The Integrated Circuit Cards (ICCs) compliant with the Europay-Visa-Mastercard (EMV) 
specifications [2]. 
 
EMV is a standard for payments with Integrated Circuit Cards (ICC), i.e credit cards that incorporate a 
smart chip. In the 1990s, Europay, MasterCard and Visa took the initiative for EMV. Currently, EMV 
standard is maintained by EMVCo.  
The EMV specifications define a set of rules that impose minimum functionalities to implement and how 
to implement them. Four books present EMV specifications [2]: 
 Book1: Application Independent ICC to terminal 
 Book2: Security and Key Management 
 Book3: Application Specification 
 Book4: Cardholder, Attendant, and Acquirer 
In our work, we are particularly interested in application specifications defined by the book3 and security 
and key management presented in the book2, especially, transactions between card and terminal in terms of 
Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) commands.  
 
All smartcards follow the ISO/IEC 7816 standard [9] while, most of smartcards in banking or credit cards 
adhere to the EMV Standard [2] called EMV cards. In our work, we treat EMV card that interacts with 
terminal to ensure payment transaction. The terminal sends APDU command to the card, and the card 
responds with a response. Thus, the interaction between terminal and card is done through a set of 
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commands/responses sent by terminal and card respectively.  
In order to perform a successful EMV Transaction, there are six steps to follow: 
 Application Selection: The first APDU command is sent by the terminal to select the application. This 
command is SELECT APPLICATION command APDU used to select the wanted applet present in the card 
using its AID (Applet IDentifier). 
 Initialization of EMV Transaction using the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command. It makes the card 
ready to communicate with the terminal. 
 Card Authentication: There two types of card authentication: Static authentication and dynamic one. For 
static authentication, the terminal signs static data, containing in the card, using a public key to prove the card 
legitimacy.  While dynamic authentication allows terminal to authenticate the card dynamically using 
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command APDU. So, the card must renew the signature for each transaction. 
Then, the signature depends on the transaction and remains unique for each one. 
 Cardholder authentication:  the cardholder enters his Personal Identification Number (PIN) through the 
terminal. The terminal sends this PIN code to the card  and verify it with VERIFY command APDU. 
 Cryptogram generation: since authentication of both the card and the cardholder are performed, the 
necessary parameters are initialized. The terminal decides to send GENERATE APPLICATION 
CRYPTOGRAM command. The data field of this command APDU contains Transactions amount, currency 
and terminal capabilities [10]. 
Our approach is based on these APDU commands to model communication between EMV card and 
terminal.  Then, generate vulnerability test cases of the system. The following section describes the tools used 
to achieve our objective. 
3. Tools used to apply our approach 
SysML (System Modeling Language) is a general-purpose modeling language for systems engineering 
applications. It reuses a subset of UML2.0 and defines additional extensions by using UML’s profile 
mechanism [7].  
Rodin is an open source platform and an Eclipse-based IDE for Event-B which provides effective support 
for refinement and mathematical proof. It contributes to the Eclipse framework and is further extendable with 
plugins like UML-B. UML-B [3] is a graphical formal modeling notation which relies on Event-B for its 
semantics. It is a plug-in for RODIN toolkits and implemented by the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF)[5]. 
UML-B has its own meta-model and provides tool support, including drawing tools based on UML and a 
translator to generate Event-B models [6].  
ProB is an animator and model checker for the B method. It allows automatic animation of B specifications.  
In addition to B method, ProB support now even Event-B method.  
Event-B is derived from B method. It keeps the classical B-method [8] concepts and adds the event concept. 
Event-B models present well-defined syntax, concepts and semantics and it is possible to test them by proving 
that transitions (events) made during the software process are correct. In this context, an Automatic generation 
of vulnerability tests for the Java Card byte code verifier has been performed [11]. To ensure the correctness of 
a model, Event-B uses proof obligations which are supported by Rodin automated proof tool [4]. 
4. Result and our new approach 
As part of our research, we are interested in security and vulnerability tests which aim to ensure that the 
behavior rejected by the model is also rejected by its implementation. We started by modeling EMV transaction 
using SysML language. We chose SysML because it is easier to express requirements with SysML diagrams. 
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Indeed, starting with formal models in complex task, so we used less formal models, then, we proceeded to the 
generation of Event-B model usable to automate tests generation. 
Our methodology is divided into three main steps detailed in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Diagram illustrating our approach 
4.1. Modeling EMV Transaction using SysML language 
We assume that the customization phase of the Card has already been done. In our work, we treat the use 
phase of the EMV card represented by EMV transaction. Based on EMV specifications [2] summarised in 
section 2.2 of this paper, we propose our model using SysML language. Indeed, we created Machine state 
diagram which details the EMV transaction process from initialization to completion of the transaction (see 
figure 2). 
Figure 2.  Machine State Diagram for EMV transaction 
States present the state of the system Terminal-card, and transitions are APDU commands. For the following 
transitions:  
 GAC1_TC_AAC_ARQC__AAC: GAC1 means the first call of GENERATE AC command. It takes as 
parameter either TC, AAC or ARQC cryptogram and returns AAC cryptogram 
SysML Model 
Abstract test cases 
Event B model generation using UML-B 
Test case generation using: VTG tool [11] 
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 GAC1_ARQC__ARQC:  the first call of GENERATE AC command with ARQC cryptogram argument. It 
returns ARQC cryptogram. 
 GAC1_TC__TC: the first call of GENERATE AC command. TC cryptogram as argument and as return 
value TC. 
 GAC2_TC__TC: the second call of GENERATE AC command. TC cryptogram as argument and as return 
value TC. 
 GAC2_AAC_TC__AAC: the second call of GENERATE AC command. It takes as parameter AAC or TC 
cryptogram and returns AAC cryptogram 
The cryptograms AAC ARQC and TC mean respectively Translation declined, online authorization 
requested and transaction approved. 
4.2. Event-B model generation 
Using Rodin interface, we created our Machine state diagram; we specified for each transition (APDU 
Command) parameters, guards and actions.  Then, we generate Event-B model by exploiting the opportunities 
offered by the UML-B plugin.  
For example the generated Event-B model for SELECT APPLICATION command is as follows: 
event SELECT_APPLICATION 
any C CA  
where 
@C.type C  Card 
@Statemachine1_isin_Initialisation Statemachine1 = Initialisation 
@SELECT_APPLICATION.Guard1 blocked(C)=FALSE 
@SELECT_APPLICATION.Guard2 last_store_data_cmd_bit8 = TRUE 
then 
@Statemachine1_enterState_Application_Selected Statemachine1  Application_Selected 
@SELECT_APPLICATION.Action2  success  TRUE 
End 
Since the formal models are successfully generated, we verified guards, conditions, parameters and context 
of models. We moved to animating models with ProB. So we validated our model thanks to model checking 
provided by ProB plugin. 
5. Test cases generation 
To generate vulnerability tests, we proceeded to the negation of successive constraints of the model. This 
method is considered by VTG [11]. Below a part of generated abstract tests: 
<extended_test_suite> 
<test_case> 
<step name="SELECT_APPLICATION"> 
<value name="C">Card1</value> 
<value name="CA">ca1</value> 
<modified  name="Statemachine1">  Application_Selected </modified> 
<modified name="success"> TRUE </modified> 
</step> 
<step name="GPO"> 
<value name="CA">ca2</value> 
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<modified name="Statemachine1"> GPO_Performed </modified> 
</step> 
<step name="SELECT_APPLICATION"> 
<value name="C">Card1</value> 
<value name="CA">ca1</value> 
<modified  name="Statemachine1">  Application_Selected </modified> 
<modified name="success"> TRUE</modified> 
</step> 
<test_case> 
<extended_test_suite> 
This test case presents the test of the following commands APDU series: 
SELECT APPLICATION  GET PROCESSING OPTIONS  SELECT APPLICATION 
The last command APDU presents the vulnerability test. 
6. conclusion 
The SysML model proposed as state machine diagram is easy to understand for anyone familiar with EMV 
standard and clearly shows the steps of real EMV transaction between terminal and card. Usually, terminal-
card specifications are spread over the four books [2]. So, we proposed simple models that gather the 
specifications in term of EMV transaction between Terminal-Card. Then, we generated formal models with 
well-defined concepts and semantics using Event-B method. The formal models are animated with ProB to 
ensure their correctness. Newt, we generated abstract test cases based on constraints negation. Our goal now is 
to generate concrete test cases based on our abstract test cased already generated.  
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